The Layoff Rat Race by Bernhardt, Dan & Mongrain, Steeve
The Layoff Rat Race∗
Dan Bernhardt
University of Illinois, Champaign, IL 61820, USA
danber@illinois.edu
Steeve Mongrain
Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada
mongrain@sfu.ca
Abstract
We investigate how discretionary investments in general and specific human capital are 
affected by the possibility of layoffs. After investments are made, firms may have to lay 
off workers, and will do so in inverse order of the profit that each worker generates. Greater 
skill investments, especially in specific human capital, contribute more to a firm’s bottom 
line, so that workers who make those investments will be laid off last. We show that as long 
as workers’ bargaining positions are not too weak, workers invest in specific human capital 
in order to reduce layoff probabilities. Indeed, workers over-invest in skill acquisition from a 
social perspective whenever their bargaining power is strong enough, even though they only 
receive a share of any investment. More generally, we characterize how equilibrium skill 
investments are affected by the distribution of worker abilities within firms, the probability 
that a firm will downsize, and the distribution of employment opportunities in the economy.
I. Introduction
How does a firm convince its workforce to invest enough in human capital,
and specific human capital in particular? This question has received atten-
tion since the seminal work of Becker (1962). The conundrum is that work-
ers incur all of the investment costs, but they capture only a fraction of the
returns on the investment. Several theoretical papers detail contract forms
or informational settings that induce workers to invest in specific skills.
For example, Kahn and Huberman (1988) and Waldman (1990) investigate 
“up-or-out” contracts; Zabojnik (1998) considers sales-based compensation;
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2and Lazear and Rosen (1981), Carmichael (1983), Prendergast (1993), 
Scoones and Bernhardt (1998), Gibbons and Waldman (1999, 2006), and 
Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) investigate promotion ladders and the wage 
consequences of information revealed through placement.
In this paper, we identify a new factor that enters the calculus driving 
a worker’s human capital investments. When firms receive adverse shocks 
that cause them to lay off workers, they will lay off those workers who add 
the least to the bottom line, and will retain workers who generate greater 
profits.1 While transferable skills strengthen a worker’s outside options and 
are more valued by a fired worker, workers must also internalize how 
the types and magnitudes of human capital investments affect the profits 
their employer derives from them, and hence their layoff probabilities. A 
worker must further determine how investments by other workers affect 
layoff probabilities, as human capital investments by one worker affect not 
only that worker’s wages and chances for continued employment, but also 
the employment opportunities of other workers.
We derive how equilibrium skill investments depend on the distribution 
of worker abilities in the firm, and the probability that workers are laid off. 
To emphasize how the rat race to avoid being fired affects human capital 
investments, we assume skills are either fully specific or fully general, and 
we also assume that both forms of human capital are perfect substitutes 
in production if a worker remains with his employer. More generally, our 
analysis extends to skill types that are less or more transferable to other 
firms. Because workers may be laid off, therefore, it is never socially op-
timal to invest in specific capital (or in skills that are less transferable). 
Nonetheless, workers may do precisely that.
We consider an economy where wages are determined through worker–
firm bargaining. Workers make specific and general human capital invest-
ments, taking into account how these investments affect both their probabil-
ity of being retained by an employer and the possible outcomes from wage 
bargaining. In classical bargaining frameworks, workers under-invest in 
human capital in general, and specific human capital in particular, because 
they share the return with the firm but incur all of the costs; see Grout 
(1984), Chang and Wang (1996), Stole and Zweibel (1996), or Zabojnik 
(1998). That these bargaining incentives should induce workers to under-
invest seems compelling. Nonetheless, we find that as long as workers’ bar-
gaining positions are not too weak, workers acquire more human capital than 
is socially optimal. The under-investment incentive associated with sharing 
the returns on human capital is still present in our environment, but the
1 We focus on a setting in which workers bear the costs of human capital investments. For
analyses in which firms bear the costs, see Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999), Kessler and
Lu¨lfesmann (2006), or Katsimi (2008).
3rat race to reduce layoff probabilities provides workers with overwhelming
countervailing incentives to make excessive human capital investments.
Workers understand that firms will lay off employees in inverse order of
profitability, and that greater investments in human capital (especially in
skills that are less transferable to other firms), contribute to the firm’s
bottom line via wage-bargaining. We derive the following results:
• If human capital investments are quite costly so that a worker’s total
human capital investment is small, then workers distort investments to-
wards less transferable skills and over-invest in total skill acquisition.
This is because the benefit of keeping a job dominates the cost of a
weaker bargaining position on a slight human capital investment—the rat
race incentives dominate the standard bargaining incentive in determining
investments.
• If human capital investments are less costly so that workers invest more,
workers over-invest, but they allocate a greater share of their investments
towards transferable, general skills.
• As human capital investments become sufficiently cheap, workers cease
to invest in specific skills (dominated by assumption) but still over-invest
in general skills.
• Only when human capital investment is inexpensive does the standard
bargaining incentive effect dominate so that workers under-invest in skill
development.
These human capital investment patterns are generated by the rat race
incentives within a firm. We also characterize how economy-wide market
conditions affect worker investments. For example, if economy-wide condi-
tions are such that the expected general skill investments of workers search-
ing for jobs is higher, then the outside option at a given firm is improved
which reduces compensation for skill investments. Because the benefit of
being retained by a firm is reduced, workers shift investments from specific
to general human capital.
Thus, our paper challenges the conventional wisdom that workers under-
invest in human capital in general, and specific/imperfectly transferable
skills in particular. Investment in human capital is not easily observable,
but direct and indirect evidence suggests that workers invest in imperfectly
transferable skills. Firm-specific skills are central to many white-collar jobs.
For example, managers must learn the attributes of workers with whom they
interact, and to whom they must assign tasks, and this knowledge of person-
nel has no value at other firms. Topel (1991) and others suggested that one
way to measure investment in specific (less transferable) human capital was
to look at wage reductions faced by displaced workers. Using PSID data,
he found that a U.S. male worker with 10 years of seniority would suffer a
4wage reduction of up to 25% upon separation. This is also a feature of our 
model—workers who lose their jobs receive reduced wages due, in part, to 
their loss of specific human capital. More recently, researchers have focused 
on industry or occupation-specific skill acquisition—see, e.g., Neal (1995), 
Parent (2000), Lazear (2003), and Kambourov and Manovskii (2009). What 
is crucial for our analysis is that workers extract a smaller share of the 
investment in less transferable skills (e.g., because laid-off workers switch 
industries or occupations). Indeed, Neal (1995) (using CPS data) and Parent 
(2000) (using NLSY data) both find that more than 60% of displaced work-
ers switch one-digit industries, numbers that rise to 80% at the three-digit 
industry level; Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) find similar levels of 
occupation switching at one-digit and three-digit levels.
Indirect evidence of the human capital investment patterns suggested by 
our paper includes the fact that in regions with high employment rates, 
workers are often highly specialized and have low levels of general edu-
cation. For example, the correlation between regional unemployment rates 
and regional high-school graduation rates in Canada is −0.39 and drops 
to −0.58 for the Atlantic provinces (Canadian Census Data, 1991). So, 
too, in Europe, where unemployment rates are higher and a search takes 
longer, workers make greater firm-specific skill investments and greater 
occupation-specific skill investments (e.g., apprenticeships). Other research 
emphasizing excessive investments by workers includes Landers et al.
(1996), who argue that young lawyers work (inefficiently) long hours to 
signal a willingness to work hard in the future. Our paper identifies an im-
portant, distinct countervailing force to under-investment sources, a force 
that researchers should account for.
There is a large body of literature—e.g., Becker (1962), Scoones and 
Bernhardt (1998), Gibbons and Waldman (1999), or Bai and Wang (2003)—
on human capital investment by workers when there are constant returns to 
scale in the firm; that is, a worker’s productivity does not depend on the 
number of other employees or on their abilities. A common feature of these 
models is that when human capital acquisition is not verifiable by third 
parties and hence cannot be contracted on, then individuals may not invest 
in specific human capital. In particular, post-investment competitive wages 
only reflect a worker’s value at a competing firm. Scoones and Bernhardt 
(1998) show that if worker ability varies and competing firms observe a 
worker’s job placement but not his skill, then workers may willingly invest 
in specific skills if it raises the probability that they are promoted, because 
promotion communicates to competing firms that the worker is able. Bai 
and Wang (2003) show that a worker may invest in specific human capital 
in a setting in which a firm and worker first strike a wage agreement, then 
the worker invests, and finally the worker’s productivity is realized, with the 
firm terminating the agreement if and only if its profit would be negative.
5In our paper, we characterize the human capital investment game between
workers as a rat race, as workers alter their human capital investments in
the hope of not being laid off. Akerlof (1976) was the first to formalize
the idea of rat races. Since then, rat races have been explored in contexts
ranging from labor market decisions to patent races. Moen (1999) considers
a related labor market setting in which job candidates may over-invest in
general training prior to going on the job market in order to increase their
likelihood of being hired. Moen derives this result in a labor search setting
in which multiple candidates compete for a single vacancy—the resulting
interpersonal comparisons determine which worker is hired, and they induce
workers to over-invest in general skills. By way of comparison, in our
layoff setting, rat race incentives affect both the magnitude and composition
of skill investments, and we distinguish how this multi-dimensional rat
race is affected by both within-firm conditions and economy-wide market
conditions.
Finally, there is a large body of literature on internal labor market tour-
naments, where compensation also depends on relative performance—see,
e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981), Carmichael (1983), Prendergast (1993), Gib-
bons and Waldman (1999), and Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001).2 Our envi-
ronment can be interpreted as a tournament whose equilibrium structure is
endogenously determined in a decentralized fashion by the actions of the
entire workforce. The probability a worker is retained by a firm depends
on both the worker’s actions and those of his cohort. The equilibrium need
not have desirable welfare properties. For example, if specific and general
skills are perfect substitutes within a firm, industry output is always lower
when workers acquire specific skills, because some workers will be laid off
and their productivity elsewhere will be reduced. Another way in which this
endogenous tournament differs qualitatively from standard promotion tour-
naments is that selection is from the bottom, where there are few workers
to fire, rather than from the top, where there are few workers to promote.
We next present and analyze the model in Sections II and III, characteriz-
ing how human capital investments depend on the economic environment.
Section IV discusses extensions and policy implications. For example, if
the layoff rat race would significantly distort human capital investments,
then union-negotiated seniority-based layoff rules that reduce a firm’s dis-
cretion over whom to lay off can dominate the equilibrium outcomes that
we analyze. Section V concludes.
2 We can modify our model so that a worker can take actions that make her “indispensable”
by reducing the productivity of co-workers if she is not there. Such investments are not
sabotage, but are socially unproductive, because workers will be laid off. The literature on
influence activities is also related; see Milgrom (1988), Schaefer (1998), and Repenning
(2000).
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We consider a two-period economy without discounting; it is an environ-
ment rich enough to capture key features. The economy has many ex ante 
identical, risk-neutral firms, as well as a continuum of risk-neutral workers. 
Each worker has one unit of labor that she can costlessly supply to the firm 
of her choice. Each firm initially has one measure of job slots in which 
it can productively employ workers, and for simplicity we assume that the 
first period is characterized by full employment.
A worker’s productivity depends on her human capital, her ability and 
her employer. Workers start period one with a common level of transferable 
general capital of G. During period one, workers can make costly discre-
tionary investments in specific and general human capital that affect their 
second-period productivities. The productivity of a human capital invest-
ment depends on a worker’s ability. A worker with ability a who invests 
g in general skills develops second-period transferable general human cap-
ital of G + ag. Similarly, a specific capital investment of s gives rise to 
specific human capital of as. Hence, the second-period productivity of a 
worker with ability a at her period-one employer is G + a(s + g), while her 
productivity at another firm is only G + ag.
To highlight the strategic effects of layoffs on human capital investments, 
we assume that the total cost to a worker of investments (g, s) is  βc(g + s), 
where β > 0 is a scaling parameter. Hence, it is Pareto optimal to invest 
solely in general capital: specific skill investments of workers who leave 
their employers are wasted. The cost function has the standard properties 
c(0) = 0, c′(0) = 0, c′′(·) > 0, and limg + s→∞c′(g + s) = ∞.
Workers’ abilities are distributed according to a common probability den-
sity function f (a) with support [a, a¯], where a > 0. We assume that there is 
“enough” dispersion in worker abilities, a notion that we will make precise. 
There is no aggregate uncertainty so that the realized distribution of worker 
abilities at each firm is f (a). For simplicity, we assume that workers do not 
know their abilities when making investment decisions; this lets us charac-
terize the actions of a representative worker at a firm. At the end of the first 
period, a worker’s investment and ability are observed by firms.3 However, 
investments are not verifiable by a third party such as a court, making it 
impossible for workers and firms to write contracts contingent on skill real-
izations or investments. We discuss the importance of this incompleteness 
further when we solve for equilibrium outcomes.
At the beginning of date 2, some firms are hit with positive employment 
shocks and are forced to lay off workers, while other firms (or new firms)
3 What is important is that potential employers can discern a worker’s relevant attributes. An
outside firm that meets a searching worker only has to be able to distinguish her ability and
transferable general skills when they meet.
develop job openings. A firm hit with employment shock λ> 0 must lay off
a fraction λ of its workers.4 We assume that the distribution over employ-
ment shocks, H (λ), is the same at all firms. With no aggregate uncertainty,
a measure L = E[λ] of workers are laid off in the economy. Laid-off work-
ers can potentially find jobs at firms that have new openings. There is a
measure N of new job openings, either at the fraction H (0) of firms that
do not lay off workers or at new firms. Hence, there are N/L new job
openings per laid-off worker. Laid-off workers must search to find jobs,
and the presence of search friction means that only a fraction of the job
openings are filled. The probability a searching worker finds a firm with an
open slot is P = p(N/L), where p′(·) > 0 and p(·) ∈ [0, 1]. Conversely, a
firm with an open position finds a candidate with probability Q = q(N/L),
where q ′(·) < 0 and q(·) ∈ [0, 1]. Market clearing in this search market im-
plies that (N/L) = (P/Q). A worker who does not find a new job receives
a payoff of u. This benefit u can be interpreted as a combination of home
production plus unemployment insurance.
Second-period wages are determined through simultaneous negotiation;
each worker’s second-period wage is determined in a one-on-one bargaining
session with an employer. A worker’s alternative is to quit and search for
a new job, and a firm’s alternative is to cease bargaining and search to
fill its vacancy with another worker. Workers receive a share α ∈ (0, 1)
of the surplus created. Because wage negotiations are held simultaneously
on an individual worker–firm basis, a firm cannot use wage offers for
one worker to extract surplus from other workers. As a result, after firms
realize employment shocks and observe their employees’ human capital
investments and abilities, a firm with a layoff shock λ lays off the measure
λ of workers who contribute least to its bottom line; or equivalently, a firm
offers low wages that induce these workers to quit. We let w2(a, g, s) be
the yet-to-be-determined equilibrium wage of a retained worker with ability
a who invests g in general skills and s in specific human capital.
Workers who are laid off or who fail to reach an agreement on wages
search for new jobs. Firms with job openings seek workers. If a searching
worker and firm meet, they bargain over wages, with workers again receiv-
ing share α of the surplus. If a worker and firm fail to reach an agreement,
the worker remains unemployed and receives unemployment benefit u, and
the firm has an open job slot that generates no income. We assume that
u < G, so that the unemployment benefit is less than the productivity of a
worker who does not invest in general skills. As a result, there is always
surplus over which a laid-off worker and a firm can bargain. We let wˆ2(a, g)
4 The implicit technology underlying this environment is a Leontief production technology in
which fraction λ of a firm’s machines are destroyed or become obsolete. We revisit broader
interpretations of these shocks in Section IV.
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Fig. 1. Timing of the model
be the yet-to-be-determined equilibrium wage of a searching worker with
ability a who invested g in general human capital. Figure 1 summarizes the
timing of the game.
Efficient Investment
To maintain comparisons with the symmetric investment equilibrium, we
determine the investment choice by a social planner who must choose a
common investment for all workers in a firm. It is socially efficient to
invest solely in general skills. Given λ, a firm will lay off all workers with
ability levels a < a(λ), where a(λ) = F − 1(λ). The surplus generated by an
investment g in general human capital is
S =
∫
λ
[∫ a(λ)
a
Pag f (a)da +
∫ a¯
a(λ)
ag f (a)da
]
H (dλ) −βc(g). (1)
The first-order condition characterizing the socially optimal investment is
βc′(g) = E[a] −
∫
λ
λ(1 − P)[E[a|a < a(λ)]]H (dλ). (2)
The first-order condition equates the marginal benefit of investing in general
human capital—the expected marginal return on the investment E[a] minus
the loss associated with being laid off and not finding a job—with the
marginal cost of the investment.
Before solving for equilibrium investments, we emphasize the basic fact
that inefficient investments must reflect frictions that give rise to incomplete
contracting. Here, the friction is that investments are non-verifiable, so that
contracts with investment-contingent compensation are not possible. Clearly,
such contingent contracts could help both workers and firms, as efficient
investments in general skills could be elicited, raising surplus; and with the
appropriate contingent first-period wages, this surplus could be split. But
just as clearly, such contracts are not feasible in practice.
Second-period Wages
We solve recursively for equilibrium outcomes. Consider first the bargain
struck between a searching worker and a firm that meet. The surplus over
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which a worker and a firm bargain depends on the worker’s general human
capital investment. A worker with ability a who developed general skills g
generates output G + ag. The threat point of a worker is his unemployment
alternative, u, and the threat point of the firm is the zero profit generated
by an open slot. Hence, bargaining provides a searching worker with a wage
of
wˆ2(a, g) =α[G + ag − u] + u (3)
and leaves the firm with a profit of
πˆ2(a, g) = (1 −α)[G + ag − u]. (4)
The wages and profits generated by a successful search determine the threat
points for workers and employers in their initial second-period bargaining
session. The threat points are determined by integrating over the possible
employment outcomes. The threat point of a worker with ability a who
invested g in general human capital is
Zw (a, g) = Pwˆ2(a, g) + (1 − P)u
= Pα[G + ag − u] + u
≡ z0 +αPag, (5)
where z0 = Pα(G − u) + u.
If a firm does not reach agreement with a worker, then it has a job
vacancy that may be filled by a searching worker. A firm’s threat point
corresponds to the expected profit it derives from the open slot that it
would have if the firm and worker fail to reach agreement. The value of
the open slot depends on the equilibrium mix of skill investments and ability
levels of searching workers. A firm finds a potential hire with probability
Q, and G + E[ag|laidoff] ≡ G + ν is the expected productivity of a laid-off
worker. It follows that a firm’s threat point is
Z f = (1 −α)Q[G + ν− u]. (6)
A worker’s threat point increases with her general skill investment, the
unemployment alternative u, her bargaining power α, and the probability P
of successful search. Conversely, a firm’s threat point decreases with u, but
increases with the general human capital investments made throughout the
economy by workers. These threat points determine equilibrium wages. The
wage outcome of bargaining between a firm and a worker with ability a who
made a general human capital investment g and specific skill investment s
is
w2(a, g, s) = α[G + ag + as − Z f − Zw (a, g)] + Zw (a, g)
≡ w0(Z f , u) + α[1 + (1 − α)P]ag + αas, (7) 
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where w0(Z f , u) is a constant, α[1 + (1 − α)P] is the contribution of gen-
eral skills to wages, and α is the contribution of specific skills. We index 
w0 by Z f and u to emphasize that it is decreasing in Z f —specifically, 
in the general human capital investments made outside the firm—and is 
increasing in u. In particular, workers internalize how their human capital 
investments affect their own threat points, but they do not internalize the 
consequences for the threat points of other agents. A worker’s wage rises 
with her bargaining power and with factors that improve her bargaining 
position relative to the firm’s.
Having solved for second-period wages as a function of ability and 
human capital investments, we can solve for firm profits:
π (a, g, s) = (1 −α)[G + ag + as − Z f − Zw (a, g)] + Z f . (8)
From the perspective of a worker with skill a, the profits of her employer
from a human capital investment (g, s) equal (1 −α)a[g + s − Pαg] plus a
constant. In particular, fixing the total investment in human capital, g + s, a
firm earns more from a worker who acquired more specific human capital.
Also, the more likely a worker is to find a new job, the more the worker
extracts in bargaining from an investment in general skills. This implies
a greater difference in firm profits from investing in specific rather than
general skills. That is, while both wages and profits rise with a, g, and
s, the firm extracts a greater share of the investment in specific skills
than in general skills, as competing firms only value transferable skill
investments.
The key feature of the environment that drives our analysis is that even
workers who invest only in general skills incur costs from being laid off.
In our setting, these costs are driven by the possibility that laid-off workers
will not find jobs and by the weakened bargaining positions of searching
workers.5 However, our results extend if the costs take a different form,
for example, psychological costs from being laid off, or if laid-off workers
find jobs in a secondary sector at lower wages. Our bargaining/search set-
ting endogenizes these costs and the solutions for outside wages, and lends
itself to a tractable analysis of how conditions both inside and outside the
firm influence investments. Owing to these costs, workers have incentives
5 In our model, this weaker bargaining position reflects the finite (two-period) horizon, and
would not appear in a stationary model with risk-neutral workers. But, in the real world, this
weakened bargaining position emerges when searching workers have strictly concave utility
and face borrowing constraints—as savings fall, they accept worse terms in lieu of contin-
ued search. Evidence of this includes (i) workers grow less particular when unemployment
insurance runs out ( job take-up rises), and (ii) as savings fall, workers are more likely to
switch occupations or sectors. This suggests that the weaker bargaining position of searching
workers is relevant, in practice.
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to make skill investments that raise their relative profitability to their em-
ployers, thereby lowering the probability that they are laid off.
Equilibrium Human Capital Investments
After layoff shocks are revealed, each firm chooses which workers
to fire, laying off those workers who generate the least profits. A
worker’s ability and skill development affects a firm’s profits according
to (1 −α)a[g + s − Pαg]. At a firm that must lay off a proportion λ of
its workforce, let x(λ) be the minimum level of a(1 −α)[(1 −αP)g + s]
such that the firm retains the worker; a worker with ability a and skill in-
vestments (g, s) is retained if and only if a(1 −α)[(1 −αP)g + s] ≥ x(λ).
That is, the standard x(λ) is such that the measure of workers who fail to
meet the standard is λ.
We first characterize equilibria within a firm, given the mix of skill
investments throughout the economy that determines the threat point Z f
for the firm.6 A worker’s expected payoff from human capital investment
(g, s) is
V (g, s) =
∫
λ
[∫ a(λ)
a
Zw (a, g) f (a)da +
∫ a¯
a(λ)
w2(a, g) f (a)da
]
H (dλ) −βc(g + s)
=
∫
λ
[∫ x(λ)
(1 −α)[(1 −αP)g + s]
a
[z0 +αPag] f (a)da
+
∫ a¯
x(λ)
(1 −α)[(1 −αP)g + s]
[w0 +α[1 + (1 −α)P]ag +αas] f (a)da
]
H (dλ) −βc(g + s).
(9)
In a symmetric equilibrium in which all workers in a firm make the same
human capital investments, the only differences in the profits generated by
workers within a firm are due to their different abilities. As a result, a firm
that lays off a fraction λ of its workforce, lays off all workers with abilities
a ≤ a(λ), where a(λ) = F − 1(λ).
Only General Human Capital
To highlight how layoff rat race incentives affect human capital investments,
we first suppose that specific human capital is completely unproductive.
This allows us to focus on the total human capital investment, and permits
6 Taking Z f as a parameter, we will characterize asymmetric settings as those in which firms
differ in their likelihoods of laying off workers. These, in turn, give rise to heterogeneity in
human capital investments across firms.
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clean comparisons with the socially optimal investment. Then, a worker’s 
general capital investment solves
βc′(g) =
∫
λ
[∫ a(λ)
a
αPa f (a)da +
∫ a¯
a(λ)
α[1 + (1 −α)P]a f (a)da
+ a(λ) f (a(λ))
g
[w2(a(λ), g) − Zw (a(λ), g)]
]
H (dλ)
= αE[a] +
∫
λ
[
(1 −λ)α(1 −α)P E[a|a ≥ a(λ)] −λα(1 − P)E[a|a < a(λ)]
+ αa(λ) f (a(λ))
g
[G + a(λ)g − Z f − Zw (a(λ), g)]
]
H (dλ). (10)
The left-hand side of the first-order condition (10) is the marginal cost of
the investment; the right-hand side is the marginal benefit. The first line
on the right-hand side is the fraction of the marginal investment that the
worker expects to receive, integrating over the possibilities that he is fired
or retained. The second line is the rat race effect—the marginal increase
in the probability of being retained (due to the greater investment) times
the expected wage difference from being retained versus being fired. In-
spection reveals that the symmetric equilibrium is unique when it exists.
To see this, multiply both sides of (10) by g: the left-hand side is a con-
vex function of g and the right-hand side is linear in g, implying a unique
solution.
When abilities are uniformly distributed, the symmetric equilibrium
exists if and only if there is sufficient dispersion in worker abilities; that is,
if and only if the density f (a) is small enough. In particular, when ability
is uniformly distributed, there does not exist asymmetric equilibria with
multiple positive investments, because the marginal benefit from a higher
investment simplifies to the right-hand side of (10) (because f (a(λ)) is a
constant). Hence, the only form that asymmetric equilibria can take has
some workers making a common positive investment, and all other work-
ers investing nothing. The right-hand side is increasing in f (a): with less
dispersion, a marginally higher investment allows a worker to “pass” more
ability types; and for all f (a) sufficiently high, some workers prefer not to
invest and to accept that they will be the first to be fired in the event of
layoffs.7 For such high f (a), the fraction of workers that does not invest
leaves workers indifferent between the positive and zero skill investments.
Asymmetric equilibria otherwise share the properties of symmetric equilib-
ria, and in what follows we assume that there is sufficient dispersion in
worker abilities that the symmetric equilibrium exists.
7 Most starkly, the symmetric equilibrium does not exist if workers have identical abilities,
as a worker could then ensure retention by investing marginally more than other workers.
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When workers have almost all the bargaining power (i.e., α→ 1) the
first-order condition characterizing equilibrium investments given by equa-
tion (10) becomes
βc′(g) = E[a] −
∫
λ
[λ(1 − P)E[a|a < a(λ)]]H (dλ)
+
∫
λ
[
a(λ)
g
(1 − P)(G + a(λ)g − u) f (a(λ))
]
H (dλ). (11)
Comparing the equilibrium investment with the social optimum, given by
equation (2), reveals the following proposition.
Proposition 1. As α→ 1, the equilibrium human capital investment ex-
ceeds the socially optimal investment.
Proof : Immediate. The first two terms on the left-hand sides of equations
(2) and (11) are equal, but the last term in (11) is positive and has no
analogue in (2). 
This last term in (11) reflects the internal rat race between workers
that arises when there is positive unemployment. A fraction E[λ](1 − P)
of workers will be unable to find jobs, no matter what human capital
investments are made. Socially, it is not optimal for workers to increase their
own skill investments in order to raise the probability that other workers are
laid off. Privately, however, workers internalize the fact that if they invest
more, they are less likely to be unemployed and only receiving benefit
u. A marginally greater investment in general skills marginally reduces by
a(λ)/g the layoff probability at a firm that must lay off a fraction λ of its
labor force, and (G + a(λ)g − u) is the gain from escaping the layoff. As
a result of this rat race, if workers have sufficient bargaining power, they
invest more than is socially optimal.
More generally, workers over-invest in skill development if and only if
they have sufficient bargaining power. This follows immediately from the
observation that investment is increasing in a worker’s bargaining power:
each of the three terms on the right-hand side of equation (10) is increasing
in α. Intuitively, as we reduce α, workers reduce investments because they
receive a smaller share of any investment but still incur all of the cost.
Most sharply, when workers have no bargaining power (i.e., α= 0) they
do not invest at all. It follows that there is a unique sharing rule α∗ that
induces efficient investment in general skills.8
Differentiation yields several other interesting comparative statics results
on worker investments.
8 The existence of such an optimal sharing rule relies on the premise that specific skills are
unproductive.
• H (λ): As long as the density of worker abilities does not decline too
quickly—i.e., provided that f ′(·) is not too negative9—then taking market
conditions outside the firm as given, when layoffs within a firm are more
likely, workers invest more effort to avoid being laid off.
• Z f : Investment is decreasing in the strength of the firm’s bargaining po-
sition. Most concretely, if workers outside the firm invest more, workers
inside the firm invest less.
• u: The greater u is, the less workers invest in human capital. Increasing
unemployment compensation, u, reduces the cost of being laid off, and
hence induces workers to invest less. In particular, if workers over-invest
in general capital, it may be optimal for the government to increase
unemployment compensation, to reduce rat race incentives within firms.
• a¯ − a: If ability is uniformly distributed, then workers invest less in the
symmetric equilibrium when they are more heterogeneous (i.e., when the
support a¯ − a is greater). Intuitively, as a¯ − a rises, ability rather than
investment becomes the primary determinant of which workers are laid
off.
Productive-specific Human Capital
When both general and specific human capital are productive, the first-order
conditions describing a worker’s skill investments become the following:
g: βc′(g + s) ≥
∫
λ
[∫ a(λ)
a
αPa f (a)da +
∫ a¯
a(λ)
α[1 + (1 −α)P]a f (a)da
+ (1 −αP)a(λ) f (a(λ))
(1 −αP)g + s [w2(a(λ), g) − Z
w (a(λ), g)]
]
H (dλ)
=
∫
λ
[
αPλE[a|a < a(λ)] +α[1 + (1 −α)P](1 −λ)E[a|a ≥ a(λ)]
+ (1 −αP)a(λ) f (a(λ))
(1 −αP)g + s [w2(a(λ), g) − Z
w (a(λ), g)]
]
H (dλ),
(12)
9 In particular,
d
da(λ)
{[ ∫ a(λ)
a
αPa f (a)da +
∫ a¯
a(λ)
α[1 + (1 −α)P]a f (a)da + a(λ)
g
[w2(a(λ), g)
− Zw (a(λ), g)] f (a(λ))
]}
= 1
g
[w2(a(λ), g) − Zw (a(λ), g)][ f (a(λ)) + a(λ) f ′(a(λ))]
is positive as long as f ′(·) is not too negative.
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s: βc′(g + s) ≥
∫
λ
[∫ a¯
a(λ)
αa f (a)da + a(λ) f (a(λ))
(1 −αP)g + s [w2(a(λ), g)
− Zw (a(λ), g)]
]
H (dλ)
=
∫
λ
[
α(1 −λ)E[a|a ≥ a(λ)] + a(λ) f (a(λ))
(1 −αP)g + s [w2(a(λ), g)
− Zw (a(λ), g)]
]
H (dλ), (13)
where the inequalities hold as equalities if the associated investments are
strictly positive, and it is always the case that at least one human capital
investment is positive. To understand the content of the first-order condi-
tions, suppose that workers invest in both specific and general skills. Then
equating the right-hand sides of (12) and (13) yields∫
λ
αPa(λ) f (a(λ))
(1 −αP)g + s
[
w2(a(λ), g, s) − Zw (a(λ, g))
]
H (dλ)
=
∫
λ
[∫ a(λ)
a
αPa f (a)da +
∫ a¯
a(λ)
α[(1 −α)P]a f (a)da
]
H (dλ). (14)
The left-hand side is the marginal gain from a marginal investment in spe-
cific rather than general skills. It is the greater marginal impact on the
probability the worker is retained by the firm due to a specific human cap-
ital investment times the “relative prize” from being retained rather than laid
off. The right-hand side is the marginal cost of a specific rather than the
general skill investment. A specific investment weakens a worker’s bargain-
ing position with her current employer, and the worker is less productive
when laid off—the right-hand side is the corresponding marginal reduction
in wages.
The right-hand side of (14) does not vary with the human capital in-
vestments. Hence, we can characterize investments in each skill as a func-
tion of the total investment, s + g.10 Next observe that total human capital
10 While we focus on specific and general skill development, our analysis extends directly
to investments in “intermediate” skills s1 and s2, where fraction x of skill s1 is transferable
to other firms, and fraction y > x of skill s2 is transferable. In particular, as long as in
equilibrium, workers invest strictly positive amounts in s1 and s2, then the total investment
s1 + s2 still solves (14), and investment in transferable skills is also unchanged, as
s1 = y f − (1 − y)g
y − x and s2 =
(1 − x)g − x f
y − x .
Our decomposition into specific and general skills eases presentation and characterization,
but save for consideration of boundary conditions is without loss of generality.
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investment is a decreasing function of the cost parameter β, and that 
s + g → 0 as β → ∞. With this monotonic relationship in hand, we can 
characterize the composition of human capital investments as a function of 
β. Inspection of the right-hand sides of equations (12) and (13), or equiva-
lently of each side of equation (14), reveals that there is a critical value of 
β, which we call β¯, such that equation (14) holds as an equality at g = 0. 
We have the following result.
Proposition 2. For all β ≥ β¯ , human capital investments are small and 
workers invest only in specific human capital.
Proof : The result follows directly from the fact that the left-hand side 
of (14) rises monotonically and continuously as β is increased so that 
s + g falls, going to infinity as s + g → 0, while the right-hand side is
constant. 
Workers can raise the likelihood of retention both by increasing total 
investment in human capital and by tilting the mix of investment towards 
specific skills. That is, since firms receive a greater share of the surplus 
from specific skill investments than from general skill investments, invest-
ing in specific skills has a greater impact on the probability of retention 
than a comparable investment in general skills. However, all specific skill 
investments are wasted if, at the end of the day, a worker is laid off. 
Therefore, the cost of tilting investments towards specific skills rises with 
the size of the investment. When human capital investments are sufficiently 
small, the costs associated with a weaker bargaining position and with fore-
gone skills upon layoff are sufficiently slight; but there is a positive prize,
(1 − P)(G − u), from being employed rather than unemployed that is unre-
lated to the scale of investment. As a result, investments in specific skills 
have small costs relative to the benefits when skill investments are small, 
and in this instance the intra-firm rat race to avoid layoffs drives workers 
to direct all human capital investments inefficiently towards firm-specific 
skills.
Investments are small precisely when β is high; that is, when significant 
skill investments are costly. A reduction in β raises total optimal human 
capital investments and hence raises the cost associated with losing these 
investments if the worker is laid off. At β = β¯, the expected cost of fore-
gone specific skills when laid off is just equal to the positive prize from 
being employed rather than unemployed. Reducing β below β¯ , human cap-
ital investments become even more attractive, and we have the following 
result.
Proposition 3. Reducing β below β¯ both raises total human capital invest-
ments and causes workers to shift investments towards general skills and 
away from specific skills.
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Proof : For β < β¯, if there are non-trivial investments in specific and gen-
eral skills, equation (14) must hold as an equality: to maintain the equality
as s + g rises, investments must shift towards general skills. 
Intuition says that as human capital investments grow, their contributions
grow relative to the non-discretionary component of the prize associated
with being employed (1 − P)(G − u). That is, there is more foregone com-
pensation to discretionary specific human capital when the investment is
large relative to the non-discretionary prize. As a result, it becomes more
attractive to switch the investment mix towards general skills.
Proposition 4 presents the important result that when workers invest in
general and specific skills, they distort their human capital investments
towards specific skills and they over-invest.
Proposition 4. If workers invest in both specific and general skills in equi-
librium, a worker’s total investment in human capital s + g is given by
βc′(s + g) = E[a]. Hence, the worker’s total human capital investment ex-
ceeds the social optimum.
Proof : Using equation (14), substitute∫
λ
a(λ)
(1 −αP)g + s [w2(a(λ), g, s) − Z
w (a(λ), g, s)] f (·)H (dλ)
into equation (13) to obtain
βc′(s + g) =
∫
λ
[∫ a(λ)
a
a f (a)da +
∫ a¯
a(λ)
[(1 −α)]a f (a)da +
∫ a¯
a(λ)
αa f (a)da
]
H (dλ)
=
∫
λ
[∫ a¯
a
a f (a)da
]
H (dλ). (15)

Finally, as β is reduced further, the marginal costs of human capital
investments will eventually fall by so much that workers invest solely in
general human capital. In particular, there is a critical value of β, which
we call β, such that the left-hand side of (14) just equals the right-hand
side at s = 0. Proposition 5 is then immediate.
Proposition 5. For all β <β, workers invest only in general skills.
In summary, in economies where workers make limited human capital
investments, they invest primarily in specific skills and over-invest in
total skill development. In economies where human capital investments are
higher, an ever greater share of investment is allocated towards general
skills. Only when human capital investment costs are slight do workers
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invest solely in general skills, and this is the point where investments may 
be too low from a social perspective.11
Economy-wide Market Conditions
None of our findings hinge on the assumed symmetry across firms (i.e., 
that the distribution H (λ) is the same for all firms). The symmetry is only 
used to simplify the calculation of the measure L of laid-off workers who 
are searching, as well as the threat point Z f of firms (via the investments in 
general skills by workers laid off by other firms). It follows that by fixing 
conditions at one firm, we can characterize how human capital investments 
at that firm are affected by economy-wide market conditions. For simplicity, 
we focus on parametrizations in which workers in that firm invest in both 
firm-specific and general human capital. Now suppose that, for whatever 
reason, the average general human capital investments outside the firm are 
increased.12 This raises the threat point of the employer, Z f , because it 
increases the value of an open slot—the laid-off searching workers from 
outside firms are expected to be more productive. In turn, this reduces
w2(a, g, s) − Zw (a, g) = α[G + ag + as − Z f − Zw (a, g)].
Proposition 3 reveals that this change in Z f does not affect a worker’s total 
human capital investment. However, to maintain equation (14) as an equal-
ity, workers within the firm must also shift their human capital investments 
towards general skills. Proposition 6 follows immediately.
Proposition 6. Economy-wide shifts towards general skill investments out-
side the firm induce shifts towards general investments within the firm.
Intuitively, if workers elsewhere in the economy make greater general 
skill investments, a worker has a smaller incentive to invest in specific 
skills because the worker’s employer extracts a greater share of the surplus 
associated with specific skill investments. It follows that the skill-investment
11 A referee questioned whether a firm might profit from raising β (i.e., from raising the
marginal cost of investment) thereby raising the share of total investment in specific skills.
In fact, the firm never benefits from raising β. To see this, observe from (8) that the firm’s
profits depend on skill investments according to C[(1 −αP)g + s], where C is a constant.
Profits become unboundedly large as β → 0 so that g → ∞; increasing β when such β
lies below β or above β¯ is obviously dominated. The question becomes whether profits
monotonically fall in β for β ∈ [β, β¯], where increases in β reduce total investment but raise
the share of investment in specific skills. Equation (13), however, reveals that increasing β
raises s only if (1 −αP)g decreases by more than s increases, which implies that profits
must fall.
12 That is, perturb parameters at outside firms along the lines of our comparative static results,
in such a way that P is unchanged, but investments in general skills by workers at outside
firms are increased.
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externalities that operate at the firm level also operate at the economy-
wide level. Phrased differently, if the conditions that we identify within a
firm that lead to increased general skill investment hold economy-wide,
then there is an additional general equilibrium feedback effect at the
economy-wide level that serves to reinforce this increase in general skill
investments.
III. Ex Ante Heterogeneity in Ability
We now explore how ex ante heterogeneity in workers’ ability affects
human capital investments. Workers understand that more able workers
are less likely to be fired, and when workers receive signals about their
abilities prior to investment, they update their probability of being fired,
and invest accordingly. To glean insights, we integrate ex ante hetero-
geneity into a simple parametrized version of our model. We assume
that prior to investing, a fraction γ of workers receive a signal a¯l that
they have low ability, and the remaining workers receive high signals, a¯h .
The ability of a type i worker is uniformly distributed on [ai , a¯i ], where
a¯i − ai = 1, where obviously a¯h > a¯l so E[ah] > E[al]. Investment costs are
quadratic, c(g + s) = (β/2)(g + s)2, and a fraction μ of firms must lay off
λ> 0 of their employees, while fraction 1 −μ of firms need not lay off
anyone.
There are two easy scenarios to examine when ex ante expected dif-
ferences in ability are sufficiently large: (i) when λ is sufficiently smaller
than γ , there are “enough” workers with low ex ante signals so that workers
with high signals understand they are sheltered from layoffs, and (ii) when
λ is sufficiently larger than γ , workers with low ex ante signals give up
and reconcile themselves to being laid off if the firm is hit with a layoff
shock. These scenarios exclude the scenario where some (but not all) of
both types of workers are vulnerable to layoffs, which occurs when λ is
close to γ and ex ante differences in ability are small enough.
In the first scenario, workers with high ex ante signals have secure jobs
and therefore invest only in general skills. Workers who receive a low
ex ante signal face almost the same problem as before, except that the
ability cut-off is now a(λ) = F − 1(λ/γ ) to account for the fact that the
density of low-ability individuals is less than one. They all make symmetric
investment choices, and the ex post randomness in ability determines which
of these workers get laid off. For example, when only general skills are
productive, gl solves a slightly modified version of equation (10):
βgl = (1 −μ)α[1 + (1 −α)P]E[al ] +μ[αP[a(λ) − al ]
+α[1 + (1 −α)P][a¯l − a(λ)]] +μαa(λ)
gl
[
G + a(λ)gl − Z f − Zw
]
. (16)
20
Investment gl satisfies the same properties as in the previous section, in-
cluding over-investment when α is sufficiently large. Two considerations 
affect investments by high-ability individuals. Given that they are never 
laid off, their desired level of general capital,
gh =α1 + (1 −α)P
β
E[ah],
simply equates the marginal wage increase with the marginal cost of the
investment. The requisite ability difference that ensures high-ability work-
ers who make this investment are not laid off is then ah ≥ (gl/gh)a¯l . For
sufficiently big differences in ex ante heterogeneity, high-ability individu-
als acquire the efficient level of general skill, and this will be enough. For
intermediate differences, high-ability individuals also over-invest, because
they must make sufficient investments to guarantee retention.
The other easy scenario to analyze is where λ> γ and all low-ability
individuals at an unlucky firm are laid off. Then investments by individuals
with high ex ante signals mirror those in the first scenario by low-ability
workers—that is, when only general skills are productive, replace gl by gh
in (16), where now
a(λ) = F − 1
(
λ− γ
1 − γ
)
.
In contrast, low-ability individuals simply give up and make their investment
decisions knowing they will be laid off if the firm is unlucky, so that
gl =α1 + (1 −μ)(1 −α)P
β
E[al]
(and they will not invest in specific skills even if specific skills are produc-
tive). Again, for this equilibrium to exist, the ex ante difference in abilities
must be sufficiently great.
Finally, consider the scenario where, in equilibrium, some but not all
low-signal workers are laid off, and some but not all high-signal workers
are laid off; this requires that ex ante skill differences are small enough and
γ is sufficiently close to λ. If specific skills are unproductive, this case
is still relatively easy to analyze. The general skill investment by an agent
receiving a type i signal solves
max
gi
(1 −μ)[w0 +α[1 + (1 −α)P]]E[ai ]gi +μ
[∫ x(λ)
(1 −α)(1 −αP)gi
ai
[z0 +αPagi ]da
+
∫ a¯i
x(λ)
(1 −α)(1 −αP)gi
[w0 +α[1 + (1 −α)P]agi ]da
]
− β
2
g2i ,
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where a worker is retained if and only if a(1 −α)(1 −αP)gi ≥ x(λ), and
the cut-off standard x(λ) results in layoffs of measure λ of workers. Without
stating the first-order conditions, inspection reveals that two factors affect
the relative investments of workers who receive high and low ex ante sig-
nals. First, individuals receiving high signals have higher expected marginal
rates of return to investment due to the complementarities between skill and
investment, which leads them to invest more than individuals with lower
ex ante signals. Second, there is a positive rat race component for type i of
x(λ)
(1 −α)(1 −αP)g2i
C,
where C is a constant common to the two types. We see immediately that 
this term is the same when both types make the same investment, implying 
that while rat race incentives can induce those with low signals to raise 
their investments in general skills, they will not raise investment to the 
level made by agents with high signals (as the marginal product difference 
remains). As a result, workers who received a high-ability signal will invest 
more than those who received a low signal.
When specific skills are productive, then the case where both types may 
be laid off in equilibrium is much more difficult to analyze. We make two 
observations: first, due to surplus sharing, high-ability individuals face a 
greater cost if they invest more heavily in specific human capital rather 
than in general skills. Individuals with high ex ante signals of ability con-
sequently shift the composition of their investments towards general skills. 
In turn, this difference in skill investments means that workers with high 
ex ante signals do not mind being fired as much as those with low ex ante 
signals. We conjecture that in some scenarios, the different composition of 
skill investments can result in workers with high ex ante signals being more 
likely to be laid off than workers with low ex ante signals. That is, workers 
with high signals may shift investment towards general skills sufficiently 
that they are more likely to be fired, but they prefer the heavier general 
skill investment because it leads to higher wages conditional on being re-
tained and conditional on being fired (even though expected compensation 
is higher when retained than when fired). Intuitively, individuals with high 
ex ante signals of ability gamble on their ability by tilting investment to-
wards general skills, because the prize for being retained is higher, and 
they also expect to have a softer fall if laid off.
IV. Other Extensions and Policy Implications
Alternative Production Technologies
The implicit production technology in our economy is a Leontief technol-
ogy with a fixed number of workers per identical machine. The technology 
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exhibits constant returns to scale. This technology allows us to analyze the 
problem on a worker-by-worker basis, greatly simplifying matters. In ad-
dition, it allows us to take the “size” of firms as exogenous, because a 
firm’s size does not affect the strategic calculus of workers or firms. In 
particular, all firms will set the same first-period wage, no matter how we 
close the model; and the way we close the model does not affect equilib-
rium investments. With this assumption, the cleanest way to interpret the 
random employment shock in our economy is that a fraction λ of a firm’s 
Leontief machines are destroyed or become obsolete. Still, it seems clear 
that the essence of our analysis extends more broadly to alternative settings 
in which firms instead face demand/price shocks and choose to retire some 
machines, thereby laying off workers. However, to model this formally, one 
needs decreasing returns to scale, so that the marginal productivity of (pos-
sibly identical) machines are higher when a firm operates fewer machines. 
But then, the date 1 scale of the firm also becomes a choice variable, and 
we would have to solve for how that scale affects equilibrium variables 
because now one would want to endogenize workers’ choices of employers 
at date 1. Such choices do not affect the qualitative features of the rat race 
incentives that we model, taking as given the date 2 distribution over scales 
of operation chosen by firms; however, explicitly characterizing how date 
1 and date 2 choices by firms of operating scale (internalizing the conse-
quences for wage determination) compare with the social optima appears 
highly non-trivial.
What would alter our qualitative findings is if we modeled decreasing 
returns to scale by assuming that some of a firm’s machines are more 
productive than others. In such a case, a firm hit by a negative shock 
shuts down its less productive machines. In essence, we assume an extreme 
form in which machines are either productive or not. But were there het-
erogeneity in the productivity of machines that operate, then assignment 
of heterogeneous machines to heterogeneous workers would occur. That 
assignment would be positively assortive—more able workers would be as-
signed to more productive machines. Assuming symmetric human capital 
investments are made, in the subgame following investment, assignment 
complicates the bargaining game between a given worker and a firm, albeit 
in a manageable way; see, for example, Li (2008). However, it complicates 
investment choices more significantly, enhancing the rat race incentives for 
workers, because workers want to be ranked more highly even if they stay 
at the firm, simply because more highly ranked workers are assigned to 
more productive machines, and therefore extract more surplus.
Investment by Employers
If firms rather than workers invest in worker skill development, then the 
standard under-investment result is obtained. This follows immediately from
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the observation that investment choices by firms are unaffected by rat
race incentives. Each worker cares about which workers turn out to be
most profitable for the firm—because that determines which employees
are retained—but the firm does not. When specific and general skills
are perfect substitutes in production, firms invest solely in specific skills
(assuming that investments are made after date 1 wages are determined)
because they extract a greater share of the returns from these investments
in bargaining.
Schooling
It would also be useful to consider the choice by individuals of whether to
stay in school and develop general skills, or to drop out and develop specific
skills through on-the-job training. Results consistent with the ones obtained
in Gibbons and Waldman (2006) would obtain, but for different reasons. In
particular, schooling would be correlated with wages because it is chosen by
workers who specialize in general human capital, and workers who choose
to drop out of school early specialize in specific human capital.
Layoffs According to Seniority
Seniority rules can have subtle effects. If workers are laid off not accord-
ing to the relative profits that they generate their employer but rather by
other arbitrary rules, this would reduce the incentives of workers to distort
human capital investments to avoid layoffs. Plausibly, seniority layoff rules
could raise social surplus above the competitive outcome by reducing dis-
cretion in the layoff process, thereby reducing the incentive to manipulate
such processes. Clearly, the distortion introduced by an arbitrary layoff rule
would have to be small for such a policy to be optimal. Importantly, such
distortions would be small precisely where variations in ability between
workers are small, and it is precisely in such environments that the rat race
greatly skews worker skill investments. In such contexts, union-negotiated
seniority layoff rules may be optimal.
Selection by Firms among Searching Workers
In our model, workers who quit or who are laid off search, and may or may
not find a new employer. However, each firm meets at most one searching
worker, so there is no competition between laid-off workers for a job at a
given firm. If a hiring firm meets multiple workers, then bargaining will
extract positive profits from both ability and general skills. The firm will
then hire from the top, hiring workers with the highest ability plus trans-
ferable human capital. Firms tend to hire from multiple searching workers.
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This provides currently employed workers with incentives to shift the mix 
of their investments towards transferable general skills and to increase total 
investment in human capital.
Unemployment Insurance
Government intervention may induce workers to make more efficient in-
vestment choices. For example, higher unemployment insurance reduces 
the cost of being fired, and it may encourage workers to shift investments 
efficiently towards general skills and away from specific skills, or to reduce 
excessive human capital investments. The lower the probability of finding 
a new job, the more generous the unemployment insurance (UI) program 
would have to be. This provides an argument in favor of higher UI in 
regions where unemployment is high and finding a job is hard, or when 
economy-wide unemployment rates are higher.
Our bargaining environment, in which some laid-off workers fail to find 
jobs, can be modified to investigate these issues. Increasing UI reduces 
total investment and shifts investment towards general skills and away from 
specific skills. While we assume that specific human capital is a dom-
inated investment to heighten the contrast with standard under-investment 
predictions, in reality some specific capital investments are clearly socially 
optimal. The optimal policy prescription then hinges on whether individuals 
actually over-invest or under-invest in specific capital and in total human 
capital acquisition, which has yet to be determined empirically.
Brown and Kaufold (1988) provide a very different model of human 
capital investment in the presence of possible unemployment. They argue 
that risk-averse workers will under-invest in human capital, and they also 
argue that UI can increase investment in human capital. Here, we show 
that the internal rat race between firms can cause workers to over-invest 
in human capital and to distort investments towards firm-specific human 
capital and away from general human capital.
Finally, when individuals choose whether to stay in school and acquire 
general skills, or to drop out and develop specific skills on the job, higher 
UI compensation may induce individuals to stay in school. Indeed, one 
can motivate higher UI payments in areas where unemployment is higher, 
because greater UI payments may induce individuals to make the riskier 
but more efficient investment.
V. Conclusion
This paper characterizes the investments by workers in general and specific 
human capital when workers internalize the consequences of their invest-
ments for layoff probabilities. Workers understand that firms will lay off
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workers in inverse order of profitability. Investing in specific rather than
general skills reduces the outside value of the worker to competing firms,
thereby committing the worker to extracting lower wages through the subse-
quent wage determination process. As a result, a worker who invests more
than his fellow employees in specific skills is less likely to be laid off. The
rat race to avoid being laid off can induce workers to make costly invest-
ments in specific human capital and to over-invest in total skill development
relative to the social optimum.
More generally, we show that in economies where workers make limited
human capital investments, they invest primarily in specific skills; while in
economies where total human capital investments are higher, an ever greater
share is allocated towards general skills. Finally, we show that the forces
that operate at the firm level also operate at the economy level: higher
investments in general human capital at some firms drive down wages at
other firms, making it less attractive for all workers to invest in specific
skills.
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